A victory for the banks? Opinion AG Mengozzi in high-profile cases on Spanish ‘floor clauses’
July 13, 2016
This morning, Advocate-General Mengozzi presented his Opinion in three high-profile cases that have generated a lot of attention in Spain (Joined Cases C-154/15, C-307-15 and C-308/15 (Gutiérrez Naranjo v. Cajasur Banco,Palacios Martínez v. BBVA and Banco Popular Español v. Irles López). I reproduce the summary I wrote for the blog on ‘Recent developments in European Consumer Law’ here:
The cases discussed in this blog post go far beyond the parties’ interests and are perceived as being part of an ongoing battle between “the banks” on the one hand and “the consumers” on the other. They originate from a disagreement between the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) and lower courts about the required level of protection under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC). The subject matter of the three cases are the so-called cláusulas suelo (literally: ‘floor clauses’), i.e. minimum interest rate clauses, used by banks in mortgage loan agreements. In Spanish media, today has already been called “D-Day” for cláusulas suelo.
What are cláusulas suelo?
AG Mengozzi explains: “Those clauses allow a banking institution which grants a variable rate mortgage loan to impose a lower limit on the variable interest rate, so that even if the applicable interest rate [e.g. EURIBOR] is below a certain threshold (or ‘floor’), the consumer will continue to pay minimum interest equivalent to that threshold.” Such ‘floor clauses’ were common practice in Spain. In a judgment of 9 May 2013, the Tribunal Supremo declared cláusulas suelo to be unfair. In short, it found that those clauses were not transparent: consumers were unable to foresee the economic and legal burden the contract would place upon them.
The present cases concern the effects of this judgment, more specifically the question of retroactive effect. Under Spanish law, the general penalty for unfair terms is invalidity, which creates a right to full restitution. To what extent can consumers claim restitution of the amounts paid on the basis of ‘floor clauses’? According to the Tribunal Supremo, such a refund is only due from the date of the judgment, 9 May 2013. It held that the temporal effects of its judgment could be limited under the principles of legal certainty, fairness and prohibition of unjust enrichment, because the banks had acted in good faith and there was a risk of serious economic difficulties (cf. the CJEU’s judgment of 21 March 2013, C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb). However, lower courts have questioned the date from which the refund should begin. Is the Tribunal Supremo‘s limitation of the restitutory effects produced by an unfair – and therefore, under Spanish law, invalid or void – contract term compatible with the interpretation of “non-binding” in Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13? Should the refund of the amounts paid by the consumer on the basis of the unfair term arise only on the date of a court decision confirming the unfairness, or from the date the contract was concluded?
Advocate-General: Tribunal Supremo‘s approach is permissible AG Mengozzi first establishes that the Tribunal Supremo, by classifying ‘floor clauses’ as unfair terms in particular because of a lack of sufficient prior information, has not afforded a higher level of protection to consumers than that offered by Directive 93/13 and that thus, ascertaining the requested interpretation is relevant (paras. 43-50). He refers to the CJEU’s case law (inter alia, its judgment of 30 April 2014, C-26/13, Kásler) to conclude that the requirement of transparency within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 must be understood in a broad sense: not only should the relevant term be grammatically intelligible to the consumer, but the consumer should also be able to assess the economic consequences resulting from the application of that term, including the calculation of the repayments and interests.
As regards Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, AG Mengozzi considers that the expression “non-binding” is neutral. He then moves on to say that the CJEU seems to have considered the invalidity of unfair terms not as the only way to satisfy the requirement that unfair terms are non-binding (para. 60). The CJEU has not decided that national courts must declare those terms invalid and create a corresponding right to restitutio in integrum (para. 64). From 9 May 2013, ‘floor clauses’ must cease to exist in the Spanish legal order: they must be eliminated from existing contracts and can no longer be included in new contracts. Therefore, the full effects of invalidity under Spanish law are guaranteed from 9 May 2013 and the effectiveness of Directive 93/13 is fully assured pro futuro. With regard to the prior period, AG Mengozzi observes that EU law harmonises neither the applicable penalties nor the circumstances in which a supreme court decides to limit the effects of its judgments. This means that the present situation falls within the national procedural autonomy of the Member States (para. 68). In AG Mengozzi’s view, the Tribunal Supremo‘s approach – the temporal limitation – is permissible in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, provided that it remains quite exceptional (p. 73). While he disagrees with the alleged “innovative nature” of the judgment of 9 May 2013, AG Mengozzi points out that the Tribunal Supremo struck a balance between the protection of consumers and “the macroeconomic challenges to the already weakened banking system of a Member State” (para. 72). The safeguarding of legal certainty is “a concern shared by the EU legal order”, “on account of the many legal situations which are potentially affected and which could undermine the stability of an economic sector” (para. 74).
A victory for the banks? AG Mengozzi’s consideration of “macroeconomic challenges” is in line with the Tribunal Supremo‘s argument that its judgment, without a restriction of the retroactive effect, would cause a risk of serious economic difficulties. It has been said that the risk for the Spanish banking sector is 3.500 million euros; no wonder that the AG’s Opinion is perceived as a victory for the banks. Yet, the Opinion passes over a number of counter-arguments, brought forward on behalf of the consumers involved as well as by the referring courts.
First, it has been doubted whether the banks have actually acted in good faith. As AG Mengozzi concludes, the judgment of 9 May 2013 was not really “innovative”; the CJEU’s case law after that date is “nothing other than the logical continuation of a series of earlier judgments” (para. 49). Can it be said that the banks’ “good faith” only ceased to exist on 9 May 2013? In addition, the banks themselves, who drafted and used the highly disputed ‘floor clauses’, were the cause of the lack of transparency making those clauses unfair. In this respect, AG Mengozzi’s remark that the conditions governing the circumstances in which a supreme court may limit the effects of its own judgments fall within the scope of the Member States’ national procedural autonomy (para. 80) is unsatisfactory, especially given the emphasis he puts at the same time on the balance struck by the Tribunal Supremo (paras. 72-74). If the Tribunal Supremo‘s reasoning is subjected to scrutiny in the light of the principle of effectiveness, the part on good faith could be more closely examined as well.
Secondly, the question has been raised whether the Tribunal Supremo‘s approach is contrary to the prohibition imposed on national courts of revising or altering the content of an unfair term (see, e.g., the CJEU’s judgment of 14 June 2012, C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito). AG Mengozzi does not answer this question directly. Perhaps limiting the effects of invalidity is not the same as varying the content of contract terms, the ratio behind this prohibition might nevertheless apply equally. It is not entirely clear why the required “deterrent effect” (para. 71) should not date further back than 9 May 2013. One could argue that the banks are now rewarded for awaiting the Tribunal Supremo‘s judgment before changing their practice. In the words of Prof. Francisco de Elizalde (footnote ): “It could lead possible infringers to believe that the greater the damage, the more lenient the remedies.”
Thirdly, AG Mengozzi appears to pay strikingly little attention to the position of consumers. Admittedly, achieving the balance sought by Directive 93/13 is not the same as favouring the consumer. But AG Mengozzi dismisses the plight of Spanish consumers too easily, where he says that a consumer who had concluded a loan agreement containing a ‘floor clause’ could simply repay one loan with another from a different banking institution, and that application of the ‘floor clause’ would not have led to a substantial change in the monthly amounts payable by consumers anyway (para. 73). He seems to overlook the economic risk mortgage loan agreements and ‘floor clauses’ pose to the consumer’s household finances. His statement is all the more curious in relation to the finding of unfairness of those very same ‘floor clauses’.
Finally, it is a pity that AG Mengozzi only spends one brief paragraph at the very end of his Opinion on the relationship between collective and individual actions (para. 81). In Case C-308/15, a specific question was asked by the referring court about the meaning of the right to effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in this respect (see para. 32). Not only does AG Mengozzi seem to deny the precedent effect of the Tribunal Supremo‘s judgments, he also does not seize the opportunity to propose a more systematic solution to the disparities between the Tribunal Supremo and lower courts (see also para. 23). He just presumes that the implementation by the lower courts is “likely to safeguard the principle of equality and the principle of economy of procedure” (para. 81), without even mentioning Article 47. Is this another missed opportunity? We will know when the CJEU renders its judgment in the cláusulas suelo saga. To be continued.
 See further: Francisco de Elizalde, ‘The Rain in Spain Does Not Stay in the Plain – Or How the Spanish Supreme Court Ruling of 25 March 2015, on Minimum Interest Rate Clauses, affects European Consumers’, EuCML 5/2015, pp. 184-187; link.  The Commission, for example, has argued that the declaration of an unfair term as invalid “is not compatible with a limitation of the effects of such invalidation, unless such limitation is necessary to preserve the principle of res judicata” (see EurActiv).